

PLAYING FAVORITES? U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD KOSOVO AND PALESTINE

A Thesis
LAUREN BRIANA MILLER

Submitted to the Graduate School
Appalachian State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

May 2010
Department of Government and Justice Studies

PLAYING FAVORITES? U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD KOSOVO AND PALESTINE

A Thesis
LAUREN BRIANA MILLER
May 2010

APPROVED BY:

James F. Barnes
Chairperson, Thesis Committee

Renee G. Scherlen
Member, Thesis Committee

Phillip J. Ardoin
Member, Thesis Committee

Brian A. Ellison
Chairperson, Department of Government and Justice Studies

Edelma D. Huntley
Dean, Research and Graduate Studies

Copyright by Lauren Briana Miller
©2009
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

PLAYING FAVORITES? UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS KOSOVO AND PALESTINE (May 2010)

Lauren Briana Miller, B.S. Appalachian State University

B.A. Appalachian State University

M.A. Appalachian State University

Chairperson: James F. Barnes

Policymakers of the United States have long been vocal supporters of the notion of self-determination, though they have been unable to agree on an operational definition or a consistent application of policy. Two of the most recent and most salient challenges to the United States foreign policy on self-determination movements abroad have been Kosovo and Palestine. These movements are both characterized by territorial, ethnic, and religious elements. They both have achieved a degree of political autonomy within the borders of an existing state. They have both declared independence from said state. The glaring difference is that the United States recognized the independence of Kosovo instantly, and has yet to recognize Palestine. The rhetoric of the United States maintains that its recognition of Kosovo is justified by its status as “unique” and “a special case.” Elementally, Kosovo and Palestine are the same. However, the United States and its policymakers have perceived it as different, and not for the reasons that that are emphasized. There are two “real” reasons that the United States has recognized Kosovo. The first reason, quite simply, is that with its vociferous praise of the United States, Kosovo has played to America’s egoistic streak, and it is being handsomely rewarded. Secondly, U.S. policymakers have made it evident in public speech that the state’s proximity to a resurgent Russia has played a critical role in garnering American support of Kosovar independence.

DEDICATION

To my parents with the utmost love, respect, and appreciation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to many for their support and guidance during my graduate studies. Firstly, I would like to thank my family and friends for their unwavering support of throughout my academic endeavors in spite of the stress, tears, and gnashing of teeth.

I would also like to thank those who contributed their academic expertise. Foremost, much gratitude and respect to fellow Europhile Dr. James Barnes. His encouragement during my undergraduate endeavors helped to cultivate a passion for politics which not only led to my continuing education, but also has ultimately become a large part of my academic, professional, and personal identity. Also, I am grateful to the International Relations and Comparative Politics faculty at Appalachian State University: Dr. Curtis Ryan, Dr. Renee Scherlen, and Dr. George Ehrhardt. I can only hope to reach the level of intellect that you all have achieved.

Finally, many thanks to Dr. Phillip Ardoin for giving me the opportunity not only to pursue the Master of Arts degree at Appalachian State University, but to be a part of the Department of Government and Justice Studies as a graduate assistant. These years and the experience they have provided have proved invaluable.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iv
Dedication.....	v
Acknowledgements.....	vi
Introduction.....	1
Chapter I: Review of the Literature.....	14
History of United States Foreign Policy toward Self-Determination Movements.....	14
Contemporary United States Foreign Policy toward Self-Determination Movements.....	23
Chapter II: Common Assumptions about Kosovo, Palestine, and United States Foreign Policy.....	32
Territorial Claims.....	33
Ethnicity.....	35
Religion.....	38
Autonomy.....	40
Independence.....	42
Chapter 3: Social Constructivism and U.S. Policy Towards Kosovo and Palestine.....	44

The Rhetoric.....	46
A Likelier Story.....	52
Conclusion.....	62
Works Cited.....	66
Biographical Sketch.....	71

Introduction

Concepts of nationality and nationhood have presented challenges to international relations since the advent of the Westphalian state system in 1648. Can multi-national states sustain themselves? Which nations get to be states and why? Can nations pursue statehood at the expense of existing states? What effect does the decomposition of states into micro-states have on international relations? These questions are often abstract and seemingly limitless, and these political riddles are enduring elements of the international political, social, and economic landscape. According to former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the current predicament of self-determination movements with regard to U.S. foreign policy is easily understood, but not as easily addressed. He writes,

Chechnya. Kosovo. East Timor. Aceh. Abkhazia. Nagorno-Karabakh. Transnistria. The characters and the settings are different, but the plot is the same: The people who live in a remote corner of a country resent, often with good reason, the powers-that-be in the far-off capital; they are a majority locally but a minority in the larger state; they want independence and are prepared to fight for it. Sooner or later, the resulting conflict becomes a challenge to American foreign policy, either because of the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis or because of the threat to regional peace and stability-or both.¹

Two of the most recent and most salient challenges to the United States foreign policy on self-determination movements abroad have been Kosovo and Palestine. Both of these are situated on territories which are historically important to multiple nations. Both are characterized by ethnic divisions: Serb and Kosovar Albanian, Jew and Arab. Both are

¹ Strobe Talbott, "Self-Determination in an Interdependent World." *Foreign Policy*. 118. (2000): 152.

concerned with religious cleavages: Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam, Judaism and Islam. Autonomous status and institutions of government have been increasingly sanctioned by the states which play host to these movements. And finally, both have unilaterally declared independence from said host nations. The United States welcomed Kosovo as the world's newest nation with much fanfare one day after declaration of independence. Twenty years after Palestine's declaration of independence, the United States has yet to recognize it as independent from Israel, and is approaches it with consistent trepidation and political vagaries.

A historical overview is necessary here for a holistic understanding of the development of these movements into political phenomena which have demanded the attention of the international community. The Israel-Palestine situation is the older of the two, with its origins in the Zionist movement of the late 1800s. Zionism is a political movement that calls for the creation of a Jewish state in the land occupied by present-day Israel, the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and parts of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan referred to generally in Christian texts and scriptures as Canaan and in Jewish writings as Eretz Yisrael. Zionist Jews believe that God promised this region to Abraham and his descendents and that the return of the Jewish Diaspora to the region and the subsequent creation of a Jewish state fulfill scriptural prophecies, which honor Jews as God's most favored people.

Theodore Herzl, a Jewish journalist born in Austria-Hungary in 1860, is largely credited with popularizing the Zionist movement in Europe upon the 1896 publication of a political pamphlet printed in German and titled "Der Judenstaat," which translates to "The

Jewish State.”² Herzl writes in his treatise that the creation of a Jewish state is not only predetermined by scriptural prophecy, but that it would also serve as the only viable solution for the prevalent anti-Semitism in European countries with a substantial Jewish population³ and explicates a specific plan for the creation of a Jewish state, including which groups and organizations will be responsible for developing specific industries.⁴ In the pamphlet, Herzl proposes the creation of a Jewish state upon an existing state and people with disregard for the social, economic, and political implications. Also, he presumptuously discusses the viability of the Argentine Republic or Palestine for a Jewish state. He writes,

Argentine is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, has a sparse population and a mild climate. The Argentine Republic would derive considerable profit from the cession of a portion of its territory to us. The present infiltration of Jews has certainly produced some discontent, and it would be necessary to enlighten the Republic on the intrinsic difference of our new movement. Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency. If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey. We should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.⁵

Herzl presumes that a Jewish presence in either of these areas would help to civilize, economically enhance, and generally benefit the indigenous populations, and that upon recognizing this contribution these populations would welcome the presence of a Jewish state. This apparent disregard of other groups inhabiting any particular region would be a continuing trend within the Zionist movement, a trend which is evident in Israeli-Palestinian discourse, even now.

² Theodore Herzl, “The Jewish State.” 1896, 1. <http://www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pdf> (Accessed November 30 , 2009)

³ Ibid, 5.

⁴ Ibid, 13.

⁵ Ibid, 15.

The next Zionist landmark and stepping stone in the creation of an Israeli state came in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration. The declaration came in the form of a letter written by British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Walter Rothschild, a British politician and ardent supporter of the Zionist movement. The declaration was unambiguous in its profession of British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, a region which was, at that time, a part of the Ottoman Empire. Balfour states in his letter,

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.⁶

This letter is largely credited with fanning the flames of an already smoldering European Zionist movement.

Shortly after, in 1922, the League of Nations officially created the British Mandate of Palestine, which gave the British government jurisdiction over the territory and further encouraged, with British oversight, the creation of a Jewish homeland in the region. The document states, "The Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."⁷ With this Britain began to facilitate and regulate immigration of European Jews to Palestine. Clearly, this did not go unnoticed by the Arab

⁶ Arthur James Balfour, *The Balfour Declaration*. November 2, 1917.
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/balfour.html> (Accessed November 30, 2009)

⁷ League of Nations, "The Palestine Mandate." July 24, 1922, <http://www.mideastweb.org/mandate.htm> (Accessed November 30, 2009)

population which also occupied the territory. Marked rioting by the Arab population occurred in 1920, 1921, and 1929 in opposition to Balfour and the British Mandate.⁸

Fueled by Nazi anti-Semitism sweeping Europe in the 1930's and 1940's, Jewish immigration to Palestine sharply increased. Although the British attempted to halt immigration to Palestine, it continued throughout the 1940's. Contention over immigration combined with a pan-European feeling of guilt and pity for the atrocities suffered by the Jewish community during the Holocaust of World War II added to the tension in the region. In 1947 the British Mandate ended and the territory was turned over to the United Nations. The UN passed a resolution to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, continuing to add to the friction between the two groups and constructing the foundation for territorial disputes, especially over Gaza and the West Bank for years to come. Ultimately the fighting would engage the entire region — Syria, Jordan, and Egypt — on the side of the Palestinians. In spite of the regional effort, Jewish forces defeated Arab and Palestinian forces resulting in the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine on May 14, 1948.⁹ It is with this declaration of independence by the Jews of the Israeli state, that the portion of the territory, once equal to that awarded the Palestinians,

Expanded to occupy 77 percent of the territory of Palestine. Israel also occupied the larger part of Jerusalem. Over half of the indigenous Palestinian population fled or were expelled. Jordan and Egypt occupied the other parts of the territory assigned by the partition resolution to the Palestinian Arab State which did not come into being.¹⁰

⁸ "Israel and Palestine: A Brief History." June 10, 2009, [http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm#The British Mandate](http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm#The%20British%20Mandate) (Accessed November 30, 2009)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ United Nations, "Question of Palestine: History." <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html> (Accessed November 30, 2009)

The Six Day War erupted in the region in 1967, prompted in part by residual tension from the 1948 conflict, as well as Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 which interrupted trade to Israel. This conflict resulted in Israel's occupation of remaining Palestinian Territories, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which had been under the jurisdiction of Jordan and Egypt, respectively.¹¹ United Nations Security Council resolution 242 deemed this Israeli expansion unlawful and called for Israeli withdrawal from these territories. Although the 1967 War was the last large-scale conflict in the region, the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain at the center of territorial disputes in the region today and the conflicts in the region continue.

In 1982, provoked by Palestinian aggression toward Israeli settlements in Galilee, Israel invaded Lebanon with the intent of decimating the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) presence in the southern part of the country, which included settlements, weapons stores, and training camps. This attack resulted in large-scale migration and massacres of Palestinian refugees.¹² Lebanese forces, authorized by Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, decimated the populations of the Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila looking for PLO fighters hidden among the refugees.¹³

In the following years, Israelis not only continued to occupy Palestine, but settlements continued to crop up in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank, contributing to the already-existing friction between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. This

¹¹ The Six Day War, "Causes and Consequences. Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America. 2007, <http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/introduction.asp> (Accessed November 30, 2009)

¹² Palestine Facts, "Why did Israel invade Lebanon in 1982?" 2009, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_lebanon_198x_backgd.php (Accessed December 1, 2009)

¹³ Palestine Facts, "What happened at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982?" 2009, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_sabra_shatila.php (Accessed December 1, 2009)

culminated in what is known as the First Intifada, where Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories rioted with makeshift weapons and little organization against the Israeli occupiers.¹⁴ This uprising resulted in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988, however, this announcement largely fell on the deaf ears of the international community. Because this document did not assert a Palestinian claim to all of the Palestinian and Israeli territories, it was widely interpreted as Palestinian acceptance of the existence of the state of Israel.¹⁵

Since the declaration, many attempts at negotiating a final solution for the region have been made, but none have succeeded. These proposals, fora, conferences, conventions, and agreements have collectively come to be known as the “peace process.” At the behest of the United States, an unsuccessful peace conference was held in Madrid in 1991. In 1993 the Israeli government and the PLO convened again in Oslo, Norway. It is here that the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” was agreed upon and signed in Washington, D.C. This document states that “Israel agreed to a gradual devolution of power in the territories and an initial withdrawal from much of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area in the West Bank, and, within three years this devolution of power, to enter into negotiations for a final status agreement, covering refugees, borders, Jerusalem, settlements, security, and Palestinian statehood.”¹⁶

The remainder of the 1990’s was characterized by general mistrust on both sides of the issue which prevented full commitment to the Oslo Accords and a stalemate in the

¹⁴ Benny Morris, *One State, Two States*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 123-124.

¹⁵ Ibid, 126.

¹⁶ Ibid, 128.

peace process. The United States hosted yet another summit on the issue in July 2000 at Camp David, Maryland; again, no agreement was reached between the two parties. Violence broke out once again when Israel's Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, a holy site in Jerusalem for both Jews and Muslims.¹⁷ This second, or Al Aqsa, Intifada lasted around two years, with little more than vocal opposition to the violence from the international community.

In 2002, the United States proposed the so-called "Road Map Peace Plan" for the region, which calls for an end to violence, as well as Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories. The goal of the Road Map is to create conditions in the region conducive to negotiating a final solution, and the plan remains the touchstone for discussion about the Israel-Palestine issue. However, with its main sponsor, President George W. Bush, out of office, the Road Map has fallen by the wayside.¹⁸

For a complete understanding of the contemporary Kosovo issue, the discussion must begin with the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Yugoslavia became a kingdom in 1918 upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and reinvented itself as a socialist state at the end of World War II.¹⁹ Before its collapse, Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, as well as the two autonomous regions Vojvodina and Kosovo.

The elections of Franjo Tudjman in the republic of Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 1990 are largely credited as the impetus for the breakup of Yugoslavia. Michael

¹⁷ Palestinian Facts, "What happened during the Al-Aqsa Intifada?" 2009, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_alagsa_course.php (Accessed December 1, 2009)

¹⁸ Sharon Otterman, "Middle East: The Road Map to Peace," CouncilonForeignRelations.Org. February 7, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7738/> (Accessed December 1, 2009)

¹⁹ Michael G. Roskin, *The Rebirth of Eastern Europe*. 4th Edition. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), 31.

Roskin explains, “By that point, with the two strongest and least flexible personalities of Yugoslavia’s two leading republics whipping up their respective constituencies, breakup was nearly inevitable.”²⁰

In 1991, Yugoslavs began to divide and claim territories according to ethnic identities. Slovenia and Croatia were the first republics to declare independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, with Bosnia and Macedonia following closely behind. All of these republics engaged in some degree of armed conflict with the Yugoslav National Army, which at this point represented Serbia and Montenegro, in defense of their claims to independence. In 1992 Serbia began to claim any territory with an ethnic Serbian population, focusing on Bosnia,

from which they “ethnically cleansed” the non-Serb population by the most unpretty of means □ indiscriminate shelling of cities, rape as a weapon of war, property seizures forced emigration, and murder □ that aroused the conscience of humankind. Some 200,000 people were killed in Bosnia and 3 million displaced.²¹

Violence between Serbs and Croats would subside, however the conflict between the Serbs and the Bosnians would endure into the mid-1990s. The Dayton Peace Accords were agreed upon in Dayton, Ohio by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia. This agreement called for a ceasefire, international monitoring by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), stabilization of

²⁰ Ibid, 168.

²¹ Ibid, 172.

borders, free and fair elections, guarantee of human rights, return of refugees, preservation of public buildings and monuments, and a constitution for Bosnia Herzegovina.²²

Meanwhile, Kosovo leadership used the fighting between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians as an opportunity to rally for statehood, something that had been the goal of the autonomous province since the death of Josip Broz Tito, the charismatic leader credited with resisting Soviet expansion and holding Yugoslavia together, in 1980. Any mention of Kosovo was excluded from the Dayton Agreement and the province continued to be recognized by the international community as part of Serbia, justifying its different treatment as compared with that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, all of which were recognized as republics as part of Yugoslavia.²³

An economic collapse in Albania caused by the prevalence of pyramid-schemed businesses propping up the Albanian economy, resulted in government protests and mass chaos.²⁴ Weapons made available by the looting of military depots by protestors and rioters were funneled into Kosovo, contributing to the strengthening of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a group which was very vocal about their goal of Kosovo as an independent state.²⁵ In 1997-98, the KLA presented resistance to Serbian forces attempting to quell the unrest in Kosovo. Back-and-forth violence continued between Serbs and Kosovars, each consistently retaliating for the other's attacks and creating a tug-of-war of territory. Serbians and Kosovars incurred considerable military and civilian casualties, compromised

²² PBS Newshour, "Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina," November 30, 1995, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html (Accessed December 1, 2009)

²³ Michael G. Roskin, *The Rebirth of Eastern Europe*. 4th Edition. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), 178.

²⁴ Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, *The Balkans: A Post Communist History*. (London: Routledge, 2007), 54.

²⁵ Ibid, 537.

the human rights of both Serbs and Kosovars in the region, and damaged infrastructure, leaving the entire region destabilized.

United States Envoy to the Balkans Richard Holbrooke brokered a short-lived ceasefire on October 13, 1998 which broke down after a surge in violence on December 24, 1998.²⁶ “It was discovered on 16 January [1999] that forty-five Kosovars (including three women and a child) had been killed the day before, allegedly by Serbian forces, in the village of Racak. Most had been shot at close range in the head and stomach.”²⁷ This incident prompted the convention of the Rambouillet conference to negotiate a peace between Serbs and Kosovars, however, the conflict raged on and no solid agreement was reached and only the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the accords.

Slobodan Milosevic and his ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovars garnered international attention. In an attempt to end violence in the region, NATO forces began an air bombing campaign, dubbed Operation Allied Force, in Serbia on March 24, 1999. Upon Milosevic’s capitulation and Serbia’s forced exit from Kosovo, NATO assembled a peacekeeping apparatus known as the Kosovo Force, or more commonly KFOR. According to NATO, KFOR’S objectives were to “deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; support the international humanitarian effort and coordinate with and support the international civil presence.”²⁸

²⁶ Ibid, 541-542.

²⁷ Ibid, 545.

²⁸ NATO, “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” November 17, 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed December 4, 2009)

KFOR has maintained a significant presence in Kosovo since the 1999 campaign, however, in 2007 the United Nations Special Envoy to the region Martti Ahtisaari proposed a plan for the final status of Kosovo and Serbia. The Ahtisaari plan, as it came to be known, called for a democratic, multi-ethnic, and constitutionally bound Kosovo, which is allowed to enter into international agreements and organizations, and which will also ultimately be an independent and sovereign state.²⁹

In February 2008, to a generally receptive international community, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The United States, with virtually no hesitation, was among the first to recognize the independence of the former Serbian province.

Why has the United States reacted to these movements so incongruently? Firstly, policymakers in the United States contend that Kosovo is a “special case,” different from any other self-determination movement in existence. This paper will first seek to contradict this notion by explaining that the two movements are, in essence, the same by exploring in some depth the aforementioned characteristics of territorial claims, religion, ethnicity, autonomy, and declarations of independence.

The second portion of this paper will look at public statements by U.S. policymakers to differentiate between the rhetorical reasons and the actual reasons for the United States ardent support for the independence of Kosovo and not Palestine. Using constructivist Alexander Wendt’s theory, as developed in his article *Anarchy is What States Make of It*, this paper will explain how the United States arrived at the starkly dissimilar policies toward

²⁹ Martti Ahtisaari, “Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status,” United Nations Security Council, March 26, 2007, <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf> (Accessed December 4, 2009)

Kosovo and Palestine, and how the rhetoric belies the likelier reasons for the United States' favor of Kosovo.

This project ultimately finds that 1) Kosovo and Palestine share the same characteristics and components, as well as similar histories; 2) United States policymakers contend in public speech that Kosovo is different from Palestine for reasons which in actuality make the two more similar; and 3) a further look into informal public addresses of policymakers and government officials reveals, in spite of the well-rehearsed rhetoric, two much more likely reasons for special treatment of Kosovo: fervent pro-American sentiment in Kosovo and Kosovo's geographic location between the European Union and Russia.

Since Kosovo, as an independent state, is less than two years old, little research has been done on the process of independence as well as the implications of independence in international relations. Through this project, the existing literature will be enhanced with a practical application of an increasingly popular theory in international relations, further research on a relatively recent and salient phenomenon, and examination of the inconsistencies in the foreign policies of the United States and the implications of these inconsistencies.

Chapter I: Review of the Literature

History of United States Foreign Policy toward Self-Determination Movements

The interpretation of self-determination as a concept in United States foreign policy has evolved dramatically over the past century. Self-determination, in the scholarly literature, is generally regarded as an idea set forth during the post-World War I political climate, and specifically credited to Woodrow Wilson. In his “Fourteen Points” speech, Point V states that “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.”³⁰

Though he does not explicitly use the term, with that statement, Wilson conceptualizes what would come to be known in international law as the principle of self-determination. Wilson was one of the first contemporary practitioners of policy to elevate the idea, and did so in hopes of developing a remedy for the ills of colonialism that plagued the post-war and interwar periods.

After World War I, many of the European powers were forced to relinquish their colonial claims. This influenced the idea that the idea that colonized peoples have the right

³⁰ Wilson, Woodrow. “Fourteen Points,” January 8, 1918.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (Accessed April 1, 2009)

to determine their own form of government and quality of governance (within established colonial borders, which many of the former colonies decided to let stand after their respective colonizers withdrew) without external interference. During this period and out of these ideas arose the original contemporary definition of self-determination. This definition exalts the concept of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, however, not necessarily the sovereignty of all peoples and the right of all peoples to their own state. The Wilsonian view of self-determination, as it is called, is also deliberately limited and politically ambiguous in that it characterizes self-determination as a principle, not necessarily a right.

William Appleman Williams, in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, offers a critique of the Wilsonian idea of self-determination. He argues that although the United States has historically, superficially advocated for the principle, actual U.S. policy was oriented in economic interests; therefore, establishing new markets for American goods and services, encouraging dependence on the United States and undermining the ability of achieving true self-determination for others. Although Williams does not necessarily disagree that these economic policies, under the guise of support for self-determination, were applied consistently under Wilson as well as his successors, he does say that there was no congruence between the moralistic rhetoric of U.S. policy toward self-determination and its policies as applied to these movements.

Williams argues that from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, whether this was the intent or not, the support of self-determination by any standards other than the way in which the United States came to be sovereign and self-determined was unacceptable. He

argues that for the United States to support self-determination in practice, as it did in rhetoric, would not serve the economic intent of the United States. He claims that economic gain has been, is still, and will continue to be the ultimate objective of U.S. foreign policy.

Williams explains,

Taken seriously, a commitment to the principle of self-determination means a policy of standing aside for peoples to make their own choices, economic as well as political and cultural. It is based on a willingness to live and let live- a broad tolerance for peoples' preferences and a willingness, if the opportunity is offered, to help them achieve their own goals and in their own fashion. It is the philosophy of an integrated personality, and it might be defined as the foreign policy of a mature society. Though it avowed this principle, the actions of America in the realm of foreign affairs did not follow this pattern. Hence it was not surprising, as Wilson's actions became apparent, that many peoples of the world felt misled by Wilson's slogans about self-determination. It was one thing to shape one's own culture, but quite another to be pushed aside while others haggled over ethnic statistics and then drew lines on a map.³¹

Anne R. Pierce agrees with William's interpretation of Wilsonian self-determination as an anti-colonial concept, but also adds that Wilson, in his fervent advocacy for the principle of self-determination, himself paved the way for a later reconceptualization of the term in domestic and international politics by implying a broader application of the principle. She argues that the distinction between principle and practice for Wilson, as well as his vague and varied conceptualizations of the terms in public speech, contributed to later confusion about the meaning of the term. Pierce explains,

A close look at Wilson's use of the term "self-determination" reveals that it was used in three senses: to mean the right of nations to determine their own destinies free from foreign control; to mean the right of individuals to determine their own form of government (in this case self-determination being synonymous with government by consent); and to mean the right of certain ethnic or racial groups to determine their

³¹ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. (New York: Norton, 1972), 100-101.

own destiny be freeing themselves from allegiance to empires and creating *new* governments based on their unique historic and cultural claims.³²

Pierce also avers that the Wilsonian idea, ambiguous as it may have been, of self-determination after WWI, was later espoused by President Harry Truman after WWII. Truman claimed that based on the principle of self-determination the United States would not interfere with the internal politics of sovereign states, while simultaneously claiming that the United States reserved the right to interfere if necessary.³³ Truman's nebulous statements indicate the conscious and deliberate differentiation between principle and application, as well as between intent and practice, which began in the United States shortly after the reintroduction of the principle of self-determination in contemporary U.S. politics. The Wilsonian perspective on the principle of self-determination, as the international community's respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity rather than rights of peoples in general, has come to be known in academia as "external self-determination."³⁴

Since the early to mid-twentieth century, the idea of self-determination has evolved on a global scale, in many cases with the petitioners playing on the United States' loyalty, however genuine or superficial, to the notion. After World War II, the Wilsonian vision, which conceptualized self-determination as a phenomenon where external influence is withheld with regards to government and governance within the borders of another

³² Ann R. Pierce, *Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American Foreign Policy*. (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 83.

³³ Ibid, 144-145.

³⁴ Halim Moris, "Self Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?" *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law*, vol. 4, no. 1, (Fall 1997).

sovereign state, began to be reinterpreted. This new take on self-determination emphasized the right of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural groups within a state to self-rule, whether within the framework of existing states or in terms of full independence, regardless of existing borders and sovereign governments.

According to the scholarly literature, this reconceptualization of self-determination came with the advent of the United Nations in 1945. Wilson had attempted to include a clause on self-determination in the League of Nations charter, but as it was subject to multiple revisions, this clause was ultimately eliminated from the document because several European powers expressed marked interest in maintaining mandates and protectorates following the war.³⁵

Article I of the United Nations Charter states, “The purposes of the United Nations are...to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace...”³⁶ Corntassel and Primeau contend that the vague wording of this clause although in the leading text of the Charter, although presumably intentional, has opened the door for the reinterpretation of self-determination as empowerment of minorities, indigenous populations, and subjugated peoples within the state to pursue autonomy or even secession. These authors explain,

The extension of the right of self-determination...has been vociferously resisted by the existing members of the modern state system...The UN Charter explicitly states that all ‘peoples’ are accorded the right to self-determination. Increasingly

³⁵ David Raic, *Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination*. (New York: Springer, 2002), 181.

³⁶ United Nations, *UN Charter*. June 26, 1945, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.shtml> (Accessed July 17, 2009)

groups...are seeking greater autonomy within their host states, but not necessarily self-determination as it is understood by international law.³⁷

The use of the term “peoples” presents some quite obvious challenges when defining and attempting to universalize policy toward claims of self-determination. Most notably, as outlined by Rupert Emerson: How is that particular term defined? Does it apply to majorities and minorities equally? Are claims on self-determination elastic or reversible? What are the appropriate legal means and national or international fora which can be utilized by these movements, and what ultimately qualifies “peoples” to make such claims?³⁸ Therefore, since 1945 there has been no progress toward international consensus on any concrete elucidation of the Article I of the Charter.

Only a few years later, the principle of self-determination appeared once again in another important United Nations document. Article 15 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states that “1) Everyone has the right to a nationality, and 2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”³⁹ Even still, these documents either refer to self-determination as a principle, or declare certain component rights of self-determination without actually using the term. These clauses establish that no one should be made to forego his or her nationality. However, there is no clarification with regards to how this will be guaranteed, whether in the form of autonomy for national groups, or statehood, or any other manifestation of national expression within the modern state system.

³⁷ Jeff J. Cornassel and Thomas Hopkins Primeau, “Indigenous ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing ‘Self-Determination,’” *Human Rights Quarterly*. Volume 17, Number 2, (May 1995), 353.

³⁸ Rupert Emerson, “The Principle of Self Determination.” *From Empire to Nation*. (Cambridge: Harvard, 1974)

³⁹ United Nations. *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Dec. 10, 1948, <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (Accessed July 17, 2009)

In the latter part of the twentieth century, the notion of self-determination began to be presented as a right rather than simply a principle in international legal texts. The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976 is one of the first international documents that upholds self-determination as a right. Article 1 declares that, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”⁴⁰ Similarly, Article 1 of the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1976 states that, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”⁴¹ The inclusion of self-determination as a right, quite obviously, complicated any notion of legality with regard to the various degrees of claims on self-determination, and also other states’ ability to pass policy toward them.

Carley concurs with Corntassel, Primeau, and Emerson when she explains that the glaring problem accompanying the inclusion of self-determination in international documents is that there are no criteria explaining which groups are allowed to claim self-determination. She says, “Since the 1970s there has been a move to combine the ideas of minority rights and decolonization, and the result has been a tendency on the part of some advocates to define the self-determination as conferring the right to independent

⁴⁰ United Nations, *UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, March 23, 1976, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (Accessed July 17, 2009)

⁴¹ United Nations, *UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*, January 3, 1976, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ceschr.htm (Accessed July 17, 2009)

statehood on every distinctive group.”⁴² In the latter half of the twentieth century, many subnational groups have co-opted this new definition of self-determination in seeking autonomy or secession. Many national-self determination movements have invoked the clause from Article I of the UN charter as an indication of not only their right to be included in government processes in their home states, but also their right to autonomy or independence. These include the Quebecois, Basque, Chechens, Tamils, Kurds, Turkish Cypriots, Tibetans, Palestinians and Kosovars, just to name a few.

This brand of self-determination has come to be known as “internal self-determination.”⁴³ However, internal self-determination, as it is equated with secession, presents another legalistic argument with members of institutions of international law, namely the United Nations. As Halim Moris explains, the United Nations Charter, while introducing the notion of self-determination to international law, also provides for the maintenance of territorial integrity.⁴⁴ The text itself from Article 2 of the United Nations Charter establishes that, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”⁴⁵ Therein lies another contemporary complication associated with making policy toward self-determination movements, for host states in which they exist as well as state participants in

⁴² Patricia Carley, “Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession,” *Peaceworks*. No. 7 (April 1996), V.

⁴³ Halim Moris, “Self Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?” *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law*, vol. 4, no. 1, (Fall 1997)

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ United Nations, *UN Charter*, June 26, 1945, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.shtml> (Accessed July 17, 2009)

international organizations which are reacting to these groups in the interest of aiding allies in their internal politics or in the interest of global stability on a broader scale.

This phenomenon of states invoking self-determination as equivalent to autonomy or independence, is reminiscent of the varied modernist theories on nationalism. Modernist author Benedict Anderson would argue that these nations are not essential, but rather, have been created by the propagation of literature in vernacular, and the existence of and their situation within the (oppressive) other. This compliments Ernest Gellner's idea that "Nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."⁴⁶ Both Anderson and Gellner recognize nationalism as relatively recent phenomena, and one in which there is no limit to which ethnic, cultural, linguistic, social, and political fractionalization can occur, depending on how successful groups are in encouraging people to identify with any certain level of the many identities and associations they espouse and claiming statehood based on this level of identity. However, debates remain: does nationalism necessarily translate to self-determination, and does self-determination necessarily translate to autonomy or independence?

The incongruent views on what self-determination actually means to the parties involved presents another facet of the debate in the scholarly literature. While ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural groups within sovereign states are invoking self-determination as equivalent to secession or statehood, the sovereign states in which these movements exist continue to identify with the initial conceptualization which involves the

⁴⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*. (Ithaca: Cornell, 1983), 1

right of a state to govern without external interference and upholds the territorial integrity of an existing state. As Falk explains,

What makes self-determination so difficult to clarify is that its exercise involves a clash of fundamental world order principles. On one side is the basic geopolitical norm that the existing array of states is close to the maximum that can be accommodated within existing diplomatic frameworks. On the other side of self-determination is the sense that peoples should be treated equally and that since some peoples have the benefit of statehood, that others should be entitled to it as well.⁴⁷

Historically, Woodrow Wilson is credited with the introduction of the concept of self-determination into America's public discourse. Since his "Fourteen Points" speech in the wake of World War I, the debate has endured, and become one of the most contentious issues in public and academic fora with regards to United States foreign policy.

Contemporary United States Foreign Policy toward Self-Determination Movements

Given the evolution of the idea of self-determination in political discourse of the United States, the debate for scholars is not only how groups seeking self-determination use the term, but also in whether or not this self-determination will serve to fulfill the goals of the groups in question, or if this brand of self-determination movements will essentially undermine the interests of all parties involved. Etzioni, echoing Benedict Anderson, argues that "(i)t is impossible to sustain the notion that every ethnic group can find its expression in a full blown nation-state, fly its flag at the United Nations, and have its ambassadors accredited by other nation states; the process of ethnic separation and the breakdown of

⁴⁷ Richard Falk, "Self Determination Under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience," *The Self Determination of Peoples*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2002), 31

existing states will never be exhausted.”⁴⁸ If that is the scenario expected by those vying for self-determination as well as those protecting their state from secession (both claiming the same international legal documents) how should countries like the United States, which are in a unique position to be able to uphold either conceptualization, react?

Whether or not the United States should enact policy encouraging a federal solution, regional autonomy, or independence for a self-determination movement is an interesting niche in the scholarly debate. Although the United States consistently presumes to advocate self-determination, the application of the concept, as well as U.S. advocacy of certain solutions, is decidedly inconsistent. Etzioni prescribes for U.S. foreign policy exactly what policy makers have chosen as the solution to issues that arise as a result of claims to self-determination. He explains,

The call for self-determination should no longer elicit such moral support. [The United States] should withhold political and moral support unless the movement faces one of truly exceptional situations in which self-determination will enhance democracy rather than retard it. Generally, people who see themselves as oppressed put great value on the moral support of others...Governments that face ethnic challenges, like Canada, should be urged to provide more local autonomy and more democratic federalism in order to prevent dissolution.⁴⁹

Levy and Young also posit that devolution of power without official autonomous status, in hopes of enfranchising these groups within the current political schema, is the solution to questions of self determination. As Levy explains, “Young saw nothing to be gained by just replicating the state system at smaller and more ethnically homogenous levels. Rather, she aimed to pluralize states domestically, and to soften the hard boundaries among them

⁴⁸ Amtai Etzioni, “The Evils of Self-Determination.” *Foreign Policy*. No 89 (Winter 1992-93), 27.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 29.

internationally. Ultimately her vision of appropriate shared governance, subsidiarity, and self government without sovereignty was meant to extend from the local to the global level.”⁵⁰

Michael Ignatieff expands this notion of devolution in that they claim that self-determination should be upheld according to the regime type of the sovereign state in question. He explains, “Where a state is democratic, secessionist demands for self-determination should be contained within the framework of that state wherever possible; but where a state is not democratic, where it opposes all devolution to minorities and denies them protection of their educational, linguistic, and cultural rights, secession and independence become inevitable.”⁵¹

In contrast to Etzioni, Young, Levy, and Ignatieff’s proposed solution of regional autonomy within sovereign states, as a foreign policy goal of the United States with regard to self-determination movements, Bakke and Wibbels argue, that federal solutions to alleviate self-determination only amplify perceived differences within the polity and exacerbate power struggles between groups by making ideological, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious differences also a territorial concern. They explain,

While inequality might become an important political issue in a unitary system, it is unlikely to have particular geographic salience since geographic units have no formal input into the policy process. In contrast to unitary systems, federalism is built on the premise of providing voice to geographically concentrated issues. Thus, in a federation, the issue of inequality is likely to be politicized in a uniquely geographic manner.⁵²

⁵⁰ Jacob T. Levy, “Self-Determination, Non-Domination, and Federalism,” *Hypatia* 23, no. 3 (Summer 2008), 60.

⁵¹ Michael Ignatieff and others, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 23.

⁵² Kristen M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels, “Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States.” *World Politics* 59. no. 1 (October 2006), 13-14.

Scholars agree that non-response, although a popular method of addressing claims to self-determination, is no longer an option for the United States or any relatively powerful signatory to the United Nations and other international organizations. For a country in the international community as influential as the United States is to ignore claims to self-determination can undermine its foreign policy goals in other areas. Patricia Carley explains,

Because the issue [of self-determination] is so complex and potentially explosive, the response of the international community has frequently been to sidestep it. However, this non-response is becoming increasingly untenable as the inconsistencies in the present system become more obvious. As a greater number of national groups demand some level of recognition, the international community finds itself without concrete principles with which to respond.⁵³

With regard to United States foreign policy to claims of self-determination, specifically claims that link self-determination as presented in international documents to claims for autonomy or secession, the recent trend, in absence of non-response, has been an inconsistent application of policy. Michael Hirsh identifies this as a consistent contribution to problems in United States foreign policy. He explains,

The biggest threat to stability in other parts of the world was once Tyranny, but today is more often Wilsonian self-determination...In the global echo chamber, we are finding, these movements tend to study and cite each other as precedents, and often invoke Woodrow Wilson's promises. One of the crowning ironies for U.S. policymakers today is that the right we asserted so eloquently for ourselves in the opening words of the Declaration of Independence—the right of a people to “dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another”—is, in practice, no longer something we recognize for other peoples.⁵⁴

⁵³ Patricia Carley, “Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession.” *Peaceworks*. United States Institute of Peace. no. 7. (April 1996), 1.

⁵⁴ Michael Hirsh, *At War With Ourselves*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 161.

In other words, the ad hoc application of U.S. foreign policy is not lost on those who invoke self-determination in the internal sense, and many see this inconsistency as U.S. hypocrisy in which the United States claims to uphold certain values, as Williams argues, but withholds them in practice.

The examples which will be discussed here are the self-determination oriented claims to statehood of Kosovo and Palestine. The United States rushed to immediately diplomatically recognize Kosovo after the former autonomous Serbian province declared independence in February 2008. Conversely, the United States has declined to establish formal diplomatic relations with Palestine, much less recognize their claim to independence, which dates back to 1988. This inconsistency in the application of foreign policy and its concepts has fueled the debate in the international community regarding American hypocrisy and the effects of the Kosovo precedent.

United States foreign policy makers have maintained that the case of Kosovo is distinct from all of the other contemporary self-determination movements. They attribute Kosovar statehood as the final moment of balkanization in the 1990s breakdown of the Yugoslav state. Critics of this perspective argue that Kosovar statehood occurred eighteen years after the beginning of the Balkan Wars, and ten years after the NATO military campaign against Serbia in defense of the Kosovar Albanian minority. These critics of the United States reaction contend that if Kosovo were, in fact, a natural part of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, it would have occurred within a much more proximate time as the other states' reconfigurations.

Critics of the inconsistent application of policy assert that the absence of hesitation in the United States' recognition of Kosovar statehood has empowered other stateless peoples who claim oppression or disenfranchisement within their home states. The logic in this line of thought being, if the United States will recognize one unilateral declaration of independence, it will have no choice but to recognize many. Policymakers in the United States maintain that there is no precedent because they consider Kosovo, for various reasons, as a distinctly different case from any other claim on self-determination. Walt contends that this type of policy application is a source of resentment of the United States throughout the world. He argues that "many people in the Arab and Muslim world cannot understand why the United State supports self-determination in places such as Eastern Europe or the Balkans yet continues to support Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and maintains close ties with assorted Arab dictatorships."⁵⁵

Many scholars in addition to Walt find it counterproductive to distinguish between self-determination movements based on arbitrary criteria, and contend that other movements deserve the same considerations. Walt illustrates in his exegesis on U.S. foreign policy, *Taming American Power*, how inconsistency in the foreign policy of the United States can undermine its credibility and primacy explains, "Both European and Arab critics argue that U.S. support for Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is inconsistent with the basic principle of self-determination..."⁵⁶

Many stateless nations around the world have argued that by recognizing the independence of Kosovo, the United States has done just that. Immediately following the

⁵⁵ Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power*. (New York: Norton, 2005), 94.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 167.

widespread, albeit not complete, global support of this event, as well as talk of its role as a precedent, flooded international news outlets and influenced many countries' decision not to extend diplomatic relations, including Greece, Romania, Spain, Russia, and many others who all happen to have domestic self-determination movements. As Timothy Garton Ash explains,

“Kosovo is a special case,” says its declaration of independence, going on to insist...that it is not a precedent. But the 68 other members of [Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization] are special cases too. Kosovo's declaration of dependent independence is the least-worst way forward, but don't let us pretend that it's not a precedent. Both statements are true: Kosovo is unique, and there will be more Kosovos.⁵⁷

Ash attempts to make his argument, which is not dissimilar to Walt's, clear that the United States, although attempting to justify its inconsistency in policy on self-determination, risks further destabilization through this strategy. By making an example of Kosovo, Ash explains that the United States sends the message that it is possible for similar movements to achieve their objectives, especially for those groups with outstanding grievances against their host states, to achieve independence in the contemporary international system.

Conversely, Patricia Carley contends that consistency in the application of policy should not be the goal of U.S. foreign policy. She argues that for the United States to adhere to rigid criteria when addressing self-determination movements could be potentially dangerous, but regardless, is what is expected by many peoples laying claim to self-determination in the form of autonomy and sovereignty. Carley explains,

⁵⁷ Timothy Garton Ash, “The Kosovo precedent,” Los Angeles Times. February 21, 2008, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ash21feb21,0,6880108.story> (Accessed: April 7, 2008)

The United States may have no choice but to avoid the pronouncement of clear doctrines and principles regarding self-determination movements and thereby avoid being driven to intervene in conflicts according to rigid principles that certainly do not apply in every instance. The United States should, however, make absolutely clear that secession has not been universally recognized as an international right.⁵⁸

Carley posits that the United States should frame self-determination, in the sense that it represents autonomy or independence, as a last resort of foreign policy.

In conclusion, the epistemological discussion of self-determination in the academic literature largely begins with Woodrow Wilson's conceptualization of self-determination as a state's right to govern without external influence. After the world wars, self-determination was included in international documents as attributed to "peoples" and not states, inspiring a redefinition of the idea of self-determination, especially for those seeking it, as a right to autonomy or even statehood.

This evolution of the definition of self-determination has largely confounded U.S. foreign policy, in that the United States, as Williams contends, has always been a vocal advocate of self-determination, but only so far as it furthers the interests of the United States, and not without reserving the right to apply its policies inconsistently.

In the case of Kosovo, the United States, as did much of the world, jumped to extend diplomatic recognition to the former Serbian province upon its declaration of independence. The United States cited special circumstances for Kosovo to warrant recognition of its unilateral declaration of independence. However, in the scholarly literature as well as news media, concerns of the precedent set by the recognition of

⁵⁸ Patricia Carley, "Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession." *Peaceworks*. no 7. (April 1996), vii

Kosovo, especially with regard to such salient and ongoing movements as the movement in Palestine, made clear that there are pros and cons regarding the inconsistent application of policy to self-determination movements.

Some scholars, such as Patricia Carley, argue that inconsistency is the best option for United States foreign policy in dealing with the idea of self-determination, because such a non-policy gives the United States leeway to pursue its interests. Others, like Walt, who as a realist is consistently concerned with the pursuit of national interest in foreign policy, argue that such inconsistency undermines American credibility worldwide and can ultimately frustrate America's ability to influence world politics and pursue its own interests.

Self-determination movements are gaining traction in a global environment in which people are more connected as a result of enhanced international cooperation through the advent of instant communication and wide-ranging international organizations, as well as the decline of the importance of the state in many aspects of international politics. They are a relevant foreign policy problem for the United States in that the U.S. has long upheld the principle of self-determination in all its vague glory, and to deny it to other peoples in its generation of foreign policy is to project an image of hypocrisy and undermine its credibility. The other side of the argument is that if the United States lends aid to one self-determination movement in pursuit of autonomy or sovereignty, it is expected to do so for all active self-determination movements, which, as a result, undermines the stability of the state system and the territorial integrity of existing states.

Chapter II: Common Assumptions about Kosovo, Palestine, and United States Foreign Policy

While formulating a research angle for this project, I discussed ideas and topics with academics and non-academics alike to try and locate the most effective angle at which to direct my research. The difficulty was to remain conscious of the challenges presented by these two cases with regards to somewhat widely held conventional wisdom, however false, that makes it easy for most people (leadership and lay, alike) to rationalize varying treatment of Kosovo and Palestine.

A certain non-academic associate of mine said, upon hearing my research ideas, “Oh, it’s simple to see why the United States has treated Palestine and Kosovo differently. One is Muslim and the other is not. One has al Qaeda and the other does not.” Although this reinforced my belief that most people have fundamentally false preconceptions about both of these nations and their politics, I kindly explained to my associate that Kosovo and Palestine are both predominantly Muslim and that neither of these places have a marked al Qaeda presence. Upon my rebuff of this person’s unsubstantiated statements about the religious and political makeup of the two territories, he followed it up with a third, regarding ethnicity: “Well, Eastern Europeans look more like us.”

I assume that many reactions to the thesis of this paper will, at first glance, not be unlike my associate’s. It is my first goal in this exercise to illustrate how the self-

determination efforts in Kosovo and Palestine, in spite of their disparate treatment by the United States, have not been overwhelmingly different with regard to religion, ethnicity, or

politics. They have, in fact both been marked by internally and externally oriented territorial disputes, two-sided ethnic conflict and political violence, and religious differences.

Territorial Claims

Kosovars and Serbs, as well as Palestinians and Israelis, have clearly outlined territorial claims in their respective geographical locations. Both sides of both cases can relate their claim to the disputed territories to centuries- or even millennia-old documents, histories, art, traditions, and culture.

Kosovo as it exists now is a nascent country located in the Balkan region of Eastern Europe, half-surrounded on the north by the present-day Serbia, and bordering Albania and Macedonia on the south. Serbs and Kosovar Albanians alike contend that each has the more legitimate claim to the territory. Kosovars hold the belief that

their nation is the oldest nation in the Balkans, directly descended from the ancient Dardanians...who had allegedly inhabited most of the Western Balkans for many centuries before the arrival of Slavic 'interlopers' on the scene during the 7th century AD. On the other hand, Serbian Orthodox Christians and nationalists regularly refer to Kosova as 'the cradle of the Serb nation. A long tradition of melodramatic Serbian epic poetry, folksong, and religious art has celebrated Kosova as a Serbian 'spiritual homeland' within which medieval Serbian kings and princes built great Orthodox Christian churches and monasteries, fought famous battles for their faith and for their kith and kin, and were buried. Kosova is regularly referred to as the 'crucible of Serbdom,' and the Serbian and the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as the Serbian epic songs and poetry kept this notion of 'Serbdom' alive through more than four centuries of ottoman rule (1455-1912) and subsequently.⁵⁹

After centuries as a part of the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Serbia laid claim to the territory in 1912. Serbia, and consequently Kosovo, were both eventually absorbed into

⁵⁹ Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries. *The Balkans: A Post Communist History*. (London: Routledge, 2007), 513.

the area that would be known as Yugoslavia from 1929 until 1991.⁶⁰ Thus, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians jumped at the chance to lay claim to the territory based on its perceived historical significance to both groups.

Similarly, present day Israel and Palestine were once inhabited by ancient peoples with arguable links to modern descendents, and the territory also spent a significant amount of time under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism was encouraged by France and Great Britain in order to defeat the Ottoman Turks, and upon said defeat, in spite of the territorial claims of Arabs, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 imposed the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine⁶¹ Both parties, Muslim Arabs and European Jews, asserted their right to the land based on historical evidence as referenced in their respective religious texts. However as Gregory Harms and Todd M. Ferry explain in *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A Basic Introduction*,

The history of the region goes back many thousands of years. Over that time, many peoples have populated the land of Palestine – not Just the Arabs and Jews – and they lived together, intermixed, intermarried, merged, and grew apart... Though Palestinians and Jews see themselves as different now, there is a remarkable congruence to their histories that should be remembered when considering the modern conflict and both peoples' claims to the land of Palestine.⁶²

Therein exists one of the most obvious similarities between the efforts for self-determination in Kosovo and in Palestine. Both parties involved lay historical claims to the

⁶⁰ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs To Know*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12.

⁶¹ Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 2nd Ed. (Boulder: Westview, 2006.)

⁶² Gregory Harms with Todd M. Ferry, *The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, 2nd Edition. (London: Pluto, 2008), 3.

territory in question, based on a history in which both of these territories have changed hands on multiple occasions, yielding historical significance for both parties in each case.

Ethnicity

Secondly, in both cases, there has been two-sided violent ethnic conflict, and, contrary to popular belief, this conflict has been a relatively recent development. The conflict between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, as we know it, began in the 1990s with the Yugoslav Wars and the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, as we know it, began in 1947-48 with the creation of Israel as a state.

As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s, the creation of new nations based on ethnic identity and territorial claims, often referred to in scholarly literature as Balkanization, occurred. Ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo province of Serbia became vocal about their desires to be included in this trend of self-determination; however, ethnic Serbs were also a constituent part of the province. It is at this point that ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs began to engage in renewed violent conflict. On one side, Kosovars protesting Serbian rule and demanding autonomy for a territory and a people that, to them, has a clearly different identity and agenda than the governing Serbs. On the other, Serbs maintaining that Kosovo is a vital part of Serbia's territorial integrity and that Serbia has an historical right to govern the province of Kosovo and its peoples.

Though the violence was two-sided, the most outstanding illustration of it became the attempt by Serbia to ethnically cleanse Albanians from the province of Kosovo culminating in an unprecedented bombing campaign by NATO in Serbia and Montenegro

between March and June of 1999⁶³ Tim Judah summarizes, “By the time the bombing had ended, the UNHCR reported that 848,100 Albanians had fled [Kosovo]...Including the hundreds of thousands displaced within Kosovo, some 1.45 million Kosovo Albanians were displaced.”⁶⁴

In his book, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo*, author Noam Chomsky explains that the hundreds of thousands of refugees of the ethnic cleansing and subsequent NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999 is, “all too familiar...The UNHCR totals at the war’s end are about the same as the number of Palestinians who fled or were expelled in 1948, another policy that is very much alive today. In that case, refugees number about 750,000, 85 percent of the population, with over 400 villages leveled, and ample violence.”⁶⁵

In his book, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, Ilan Pappé echoes Chomsky’s comparison of the plights of Kosovo and Palestine against ethnic violence as he explores the systematic expulsion of Arabs from the region since 1948 as an example of ethnic cleansing that has not conventionally been seen or studied as such. Pappé explains that Plan Dalet, or part D of a larger Zionist agenda to achieve a Jewish homeland apart from the British Mandate system, “was first based on retaliation against Palestinian attacks in February 1947, but and it transformed into an initiative to ethnically cleanse the country as a whole in 1948.”⁶⁶

⁶³ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs To Know*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 88-90.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 88.

⁶⁵ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo*, (Monroe: Common Courage, 1999), 17.

⁶⁶ Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), xiii.

Not only has ethnic cleansing marked both of these conflicts, but so has the creation of a political advocacy group, often with an armed contingent which is seen as an outlaw or terrorist group, to fight for the interests of Palestine and Kosovo. In both of these cases, these groups, although characterized at points by violent acts, have endured to produce political parties, esteemed leaders, diplomats, legislative bodies, and many other trappings of a state government.

“Among the Palestinians, the seeds of rebellion were sown with the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as well as a smaller, more militant group called al-Fatah, the leaders of which included a young nationalist named Yasser Arafat.”⁶⁷ Arafat would lead the PLO for 40 years until his death in 2004, with his leadership characterized simultaneously by violence and terror, as well manifest interest in diplomacy and peace all in the name of Palestinian statehood.⁶⁸

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) can be seen as a similar organization to the Palestine Liberation Organization. The KLA was founded in 1993, and like the PLO, was characterized by many in the international community as an organization bent on violence and terrorism, an organization that would stop at nothing to achieve its objectives. Also like the PLO, the KLA evolved into a formidable political force in the Kosovar self-determination movement and yielded the long-time leadership of Hashim Thaçi, “wartime political head of the KLA and the prime minister of Kosovo when it declared independence.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Gregory Harms with Todd M. Ferry, *The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, 2nd Edition. (London: Pluto, 2008), 108.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 183.

⁶⁹ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs To Know*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 77.

Both the PLO and the KLA were also characterized by factionalization, in which the organizations branched into militant and political arms, Fatah being the militant associate of the PLO, and the KLA being the militant associate of the Popular Movement for Kosova.⁷⁰ In sum, both the Kosovar and the Palestinian bids for statehood have centered on organizations in which the lines have been blurred between political advocacy, freedom fighting, and terrorist activity. However, these groups have begotten the leadership and the institutions of governance that characterize the movements in their present form.

Religion

Thirdly, conventional wisdom credits religious divisions as a major cause for both the Kosovar and the Palestinian conflicts; however, an inexperienced opinion might attribute the presence of Islam in both cases as the source of tension. However, it is equally plausible that these conflicts are just as likely fueled by the zeal with which Serbian Orthodox Christians and Israeli Jews practice and adhere to their respective religions.

It is a fact that the population of Kosovo is predominantly Albanian Muslim, whereas the rest of Serbia and much of the Balkans is inhabited by Serbian (Eastern) Orthodox Christians. While Albanian Muslim Kosovars make no claims to the territory based on religion, one of Serbia's chief claims to the territory is that Kosovo is a central part of the Eastern Orthodox religion in Serbia and the Balkans. Serbs often cite the number of Eastern Orthodox churches and monasteries that have characterized the Kosovo region for centuries as a testament to Serbia's right to claim Kosovo as an integral part of the territorial integrity of Serbia.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 76.

As Bideleux and Jeffries explain,

In recent times, Serbian nationalists... have tended to claim (and may even believe) that these illustrious monastic complexes and the relics of those who founded them or died defending them have established 'eternally sanctified' Serbian claims to these lands, even though they are now overwhelmingly inhabited by Muslim Kosovars – in much the same way that some Zionist zealots believe that their 'Holy Places' and all the Jews that have suffered on account of their special identity and faith have established eternal Jewish rights to 'the Holy Lands' which for over 1,300 years have been mainly inhabited by Arabs.⁷¹

Israel is, by design, a Jewish state, but it was created on territory inhabited predominantly by Muslims, not to mention that the territory has scriptural significance to both religions. That said, although religion plays a role, it is difficult to distinguish religiously motivated conflict from ethnically motivated conflict when both variables are present and working simultaneously. As Harms and Ferry so succinctly state,

First, The Palestine-Israel conflict is not thousands of years old. There is certainly no 'blood-feud' between Arabs and Jews dating back to the sons of Abraham. Secondly, the variety of cultures and the dramatic degree to which cultures have changed over time should also now be apparent. From the Canaanites to the Romans, these are the roots of the ancient Palestinian and Jewish culture. Thirdly, Jews, the descendents of the ancient Israelites, are as such also descendents of the ancients Canaanites, the people of Canaan, also modern Palestine. And indeed, by one name or another, the Jews have populated the land for thousands of years...The native Palestinians of today are also descendents of the ancient Canaanites.⁷²

In sum, ethnic and religious divisions as conflict-inducing should, in both cases, be seen as a relatively recent development, not as a given. Religious differences are but one of the potential causes of conflict in both Kosovo and Palestine, but the peoples of these two

⁷¹ Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, *The Balkans: A post Communist History*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 514.

⁷² Gregory Harms with Todd M. Ferry, *The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, 2nd Edition. (London: Pluto, 2008), 21.

territories have not been warring for centuries over religious differences, contrary to popular conceptions of the conflicts.

Autonomy

Both Palestinians and Kosovars, during their efforts toward independence, have attained some degree of autonomy within their host states. For Kosovo, autonomy has been a gradual struggle. Kosovo agreed in 1943-44 to join the struggle against German occupation in return for its eventual unification with Albania. However, the territory was annexed to Serbia in 1945 as an “autonomous region,” and in 1966 became an “autonomous province.” These are terms which meant relatively little at the time for Kosovo and the other Yugoslav republics, provinces, and territories, as they were not only responsible for themselves, but for the Yugoslav whole.⁷³ Tim Judah explains that in 1974 Kosovo’s autonomy swelled,

when a new Yugoslav constitution redefined Kosovo’s place within the country. Kosovo remained part of Serbia but was almost a full federal entity: It had its own national bank, parliament, government, and police, and thanks to increasing Albanianization and greater numbers of qualified Albanians now able to do the jobs, Albanians were more or less in full control of Kosovo. Apart from its own assemble, its deputies sat in both the Yugoslav federal parliament and the Serbian one.⁷⁴

During the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Kosovo’s parliament voted to make Kosovo a republic on par with Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This vote was rejected by the Serbs and the gesture was lost in the scuffle of the Yugoslav wars, where Serbia would attempt to exert firmer control of Kosovo,

⁷³ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs To Know*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48-52.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 57.

culminating in the 1999 ethnic cleansing campaign against Kosovar Albanians, and again in the Kosovar Declaration of Independence in 2008.⁷⁵

Similarly, autonomy for Palestine has been a struggle since the creation of the Israeli state in 1948. Palestinians have since sought political, economic, and social autonomy at minimum, and independence at most for the predominantly Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the years that followed Israel's founding, Jewish settlements began to crop up in the predominantly Israeli territories, heightening tensions and drawing international notice. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded in 1964 as a political organization, with the more militant al-Fatah as its armed associate, with the clear political objectives of autonomy and independence from Israel. In 1974, the leader of the 10-year-old PLO was invited to speak before the United Nations General Assembly. As Harms and Ferry describe:

A little over a week after Arafat's address, the General Assembly passed two resolutions, 3236 and 3237. The first affirmed the Palestinian "right to self-determination without external interference" and "the right to national independence and sovereignty"...The second resolution conferred "observer status" (within the UN) upon the PLO.⁷⁶

This fueled, and to some extent, legitimized the Palestinian's desire for autonomy, but also infuriated Israeli Jews, sparking a period of heightened violence in the region, leading to the Intifada, or uprising, by Palestinians against Israelis that would beget the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 69.

⁷⁶ Gregory Harms with Todd M. Ferry, *The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, 2nd Edition. (London: Pluto, 2008), 130-31.

Independence

Finally, both Kosovo and Palestine have declared independence from the nation states which claim them: Serbia and Israel, respectively. Palestine's Declaration of Independence came following the initial violence of the First Intifada on November 15, 1988. Since then, 94 countries have recognized the statehood of Palestine, while 11 others have granted some form of diplomatic consideration.⁷⁷ The United States has, however, refused diplomatic recognition of Palestine in order to pursue the so-called "peace process," where vagaries and non-binding formalities are the mode.

Conversely, Kosovo's declaration of independence occurred on February 17, 2008, and within only one year, 62 countries have recognized Kosovo as a sovereign nation.⁷⁸ One of those 62 is the United States, which promptly recognized Kosovo's independence the day following the declaration. Some scholars infer that United States officials went so far as to assist Kosovo in composing its Declaration of Independence.⁷⁹

Both declarations have been unilateral, that is, not a concerted effort by many states within the framework of the United Nations. The United Nations is the organization which most countries consider to be the authority on rule of law proceedings in the international community, and therefore, a necessary part of the process of the creation of any new state. Also, both declarations have, to some extent, been a result of a combination of territorial disputes, religious cleavages, violent conflict, and a general sentiment of

⁷⁷ Palestinian National Authority, "International Recognition of the State of Palestine," 2003, http://web.archive.org/web/20060404211437/http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine.asp. (Accessed February 19, 2009)

⁷⁸ Reuters, "Kosovo Unveils Clinton Statue," *International Herald Tribune*. November 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/11/01/world/international-uk-kosovo-clinton-statue.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=george%20bush%20street%20kosovo&st=cse (Accessed November 2, 2009)

⁷⁹ Tim Judah, *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs To Know*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 144-5.

disenfranchisement among the petitioning groups. Both Declarations of Independence were also spoken by alleged international terrorists turned political pioneers of each of these movements: Yasser Arafat for the PLO (PNA and Fatah) and Hashim Thaçi for the KLA.

All of the characteristics of the Kosovo and Palestine self-determination movements discussed in this chapter serve to illustrate the claim that these movements have been fundamentally alike. They exhibit the same elements of territorial claims, ethnic conflict, religious tension, a degree of autonomy within the existing state, and a formal and unilateral declaration of independence. The fact remains that these movements have received immensely disparate consideration from the United States; the remaining task of this exercise is to discover why.

Part III: Social Constructivist Theory, Kosovo, and Palestine

It is often assumed by some scholars and most policymakers that states conduct foreign policy based on national interests that are endemic to all nations, such as survival and security. Social constructivist theory, which will be used as the theoretical touchstone for this exercise, posits that states do not possess these inherent interests, but that interests arise as a result of the relational interaction between parties. To clarify, social constructivism does not deny that interests in relative capability and security dominate the international political climate, especially with regard to the United States. However, social constructivism would posit that ultimately these interests are a social construction, and theoretically, they vary among state relations depending on the nature of the relationship between the states in question.

In “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” social constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt explains that “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently towards enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not.”⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power,” *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), 396-397.

Wendt contends that relationships among states and international entities arise out of the parties' shared knowledge of one another. He explains that the nature of these relationships can be Hobbesian, or characterized by enmity; Lockean, or characterized by competition; or Kantian, characterized by amity.⁸¹ He also explains that these relationships can be motivated by coercion, interest, or legitimacy.⁸² This 3x3 matrix of international relations presents nine different modes of international relations, which can vary depending on the states involved. In this chapter I argue that the United States has cultivated a Kantian relationship of legitimacy with Kosovo against conventional wisdom because of its unusually high level of support for the United States and its geopolitical position. Conversely, while the United States' relationship with Palestine is also Kantian, in that the United States would not necessarily be an enemy or a competitor of Palestine, it is also interest-based, in that the United States is more concerned about its own stake in the Palestine-Israel conflict than the interests of Palestine, the region, or the larger international implications.

Wendt's social constructivist theory will be central to explaining the United States' foreign policy toward Kosovo and Palestine and why these analogous movements have received dissimilar treatment. Just as I expounded above on the ways in which the movements in Kosovo and Palestine possess the same elements, I will now illustrate the United States' reaction to these movements, not because they are fundamentally different from one another, but because policy makers in the United States, and consequently, the United States as a unitary actor have perceived them as fundamentally different from one another and acted upon them based on these perceptions. This variance among state

⁸¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999), 247.

⁸² Ibid, 286.

relations is a prime example of the constructed nature of foreign policy objectives in the international relations of states.

I will also establish how the United States and its policymakers have consistently vocalized the message of the uniqueness of Kosovo as a justification for U.S. support for the Balkan nation while withholding support for other self-determination movements. I have argued above that Kosovo is, by and large, not unique vis-à-vis Palestine. However, policymakers in the United States have, in propagating this as the reason for its recognition as a state, also inadvertently vocalized two other, perhaps more likely reasons that the two movements have been treated differently. The first is the perception among policymakers in the United States that the people of Kosovo are overwhelmingly pro-American. The second is the enduring Cold-War mentality manifested in the United States' response to the existence of a relatively powerful, increasingly wealthy, and potentially threatening regional power in Russia.

The Rhetoric

Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, testified before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs in a hearing in April 2007 on the future of Kosovo that "We believe the people have a right. We Americans believe the people have a right to control their own destiny. I don't distance myself so much from every other group in the world as I know that you must in order to make sure that we have stability in the world. I am somewhat sympathetic to other people who are seeking their independence."⁸³

⁸³ R. Nicholas Burns, Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing "The Outlook for the Independence of Kosova," U.S. Government Printing Office. April 17, 2007, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34713.pdf> (Accessed May 31 2009)

Juxtaposed with the first chapter's explanation of the history of the United States' attitude toward self-determination, as well as the illustration of how the self-determination movements in Kosovo and Palestine are, in essence, alike, the double standard in the above statement is apparent. The United States clearly does not believe in the right of all people to control their own destiny. Rather, the United States unwaveringly believes in the right of some people to control some of their destiny some of the time.

As mentioned in the literature review portion of this exercise, since the relative success of Kosovo's declaration of independence in February 2008, the United States, in its subsequent policy decisions, has not been able to escape the casual comparison of Kosovo with other self-determination movements within sovereign states. The United States, however, has consistently defended its recognition of the embryonic Balkan state by maintaining that Kosovo is fundamentally different from all other existing self-determination movements, an argument which I have discussed and disproven in the preceding chapter.

In announcing the United States' recognition of the independence of Kosovo, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made clear that United States and its leadership would have a unified policy that would stress Kosovo an exceptional case that should, under no circumstances, be emulated. United States Congressman Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, expressed in a statement following the United States' recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent nation:

Questions have been raised in some sectors of the international community about the legality and legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of independence, as well as America's recognition of the new country. I support the position of the Administration and of our leading European allies that the situation of Kosovo is

unique, given the history of ethnic cleansing, as well as the unprecedented level of involvement by the United Nations and NATO.⁸⁴

In this statement, Berman gives two reasons for the United States' support of Kosovar independence, the first being that Kosovar Albanians were subject to ethnic cleansing campaigns by the Serbian population. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ethnic cleansing as "the expulsion, imprisonment, or killing of an ethnic minority in order to achieve ethnic homogeneity." The Cambridge Dictionary characterizes ethnic cleansing as "the organized attempt by one racial or political group to completely remove from a country or area anyone who belongs to another particular racial group, using violence and often murder to achieve this." The Macmillan Dictionary simply states that ethnic cleansing is "the use of violence to force people from a particular ethnic group to leave an area."

As discussed above, this brand of subjugation and violence is not characteristic only of the conflict between Serbs and Kosovars in Kosovo's quest for independence. Palestinians in the occupied territories have also been subject to institutionalized violence, systematic discrimination, political subjugation, geographic concentration, and armed aggression by the Israeli government and armed forces, all in the name of an exclusively Jewish state.

Though this treatment of Palestinians has rarely been referred to outside academia as "ethnic cleansing," with consideration for the definitions above, one could argue that Palestinians have also been subject to ethnic cleansing campaigns by their Israeli

⁸⁴ Howard Berman, Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement," March 12, 2008, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf> (Accessed May 31, 2009)

counterparts. Using dissimilar language to describe the two cases does not make the reality any different. As the old adage goes, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. Policymakers of the United States have attributed the uniqueness of Kosovo to occurrence of ethnic cleansing, when in reality this is just one more similarity that Kosovo and Palestine share. Again, this is a clear example of the constructivist notion that states react not objectively and consistently based on input, process, and output, but on perceptions of situations, based shared knowledge and on the history of interactions between them.

The second reason Congressman Berman gives in his statement for the United States' support of Kosovo's declaration of independence is the extensive involvement by the United Nations and NATO in this specific case. While it is true that NATO itself has had no marked involvement in Palestine, the organization has recently vocalized support for the efforts of the United Nations on the issue. As was established in the Istanbul Conference in 2004, NATO established the official position that:

Progress towards a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should remain a priority for the countries of the region and the international community as a whole, and for the success of the security and stability objectives of this initiative. Full and speedy implementation of the Quartet Road Map is a key element in international efforts to promote a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ NATO, "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative," June, 2004, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21017.htm?selectedLocale=en (Accessed September 23, 2009)

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has also expressed that if NATO involvement is requested by Israelis and Palestinians upon reaching a final settlement, that NATO assistance will be at the disposal of the parties involved.⁸⁶

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been a constant on the United Nations' agenda since 1947, when, "faced with escalating violence [between immigrating Jews and indigenous Palestinians], the British Government decided, in February 1947, to bring the question of Palestine before the new United Nations (est. 1945)."⁸⁷ This marked the beginning of intensive United Nations interest and involvement in the region. A timeline of this involvement, as described in greater detail in the UN sanctioned report, "The Question of Palestine and the United Nations," are:

- UN involvement in the Israel-Palestine question has included the first special session of the General Assembly (1947),
- the creation of the United Nations Special Committee On Palestine (1947),
- adoption of resolution 181 calling for a creation of two states with economic union and international trusteeship of Jerusalem (1947),
- presence of the United Nations Truce Supervision organization (1949-present),
- adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 194 granting Palestinian refugees the right to return (1948),

⁸⁶ Robert E. Hunter, "A Conversation with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer." Council on Foreign Relations. November, 2004, http://www.cfr.org/publication/7534/conversation_with_jaap_de_hoop_scheffer.html (Accessed October 18, 2007)

⁸⁷ United Nations, "The Question of Palestine and the United Nations," (2008), 3 <http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/DPI2499.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2009)

- deployment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees for the provision of education, healthcare, and other human rights (1950-present),
- deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (1956-1967),
- adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 242 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories as well as an end to violence in the region (1967),
- adoption by the General Assembly of Resolution 2535 affirming that Palestinians' rights under the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights were being violated, adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 338 and 339 calling for peace negotiations and a ceasefire (1973),
- provision of a international forum for the Yasser Arafat and the PLO before the General Assembly and an invitation to assume observer status in the UN for the PLO (1973),
- establishment by the General Assembly of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (1975),
- implementation of the Program of Assistance to the Palestinian People to facilitate economic development (1980),
- convention of the International Conference on the Question of Palestine (1983), acknowledgement by the General Assembly of the Palestinian declaration of independence in the form of resolution 43/177 (1988),

- establishment of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (1994),
- granting of additional participatory privileges in the UNO to Palestine in the form of General Assembly Resolution 52/250 (1998),
- adoption of Security Council Resolution 1397 reiterating the call for an end to violence as well as a two-state solution (2002), and
- adoption of Security Council Resolution 1515 in support of the “Road Map” peace plan contrived collaboratively by the European Union, United States, Russia, and the United Nations (2003).

This brief timeline exemplifies exactly how involved the United Nations has been in Palestine, and while the organization has not offered extensive human resources and peacekeeping support as it did in Kosovo, one could argue that the level of interest and involvement that the United Nations has assumed in Palestine is, to use Chairman Berman’s language, “unprecedented.”

A Likelier Story

After Establishing that the policymakers of the United States chant the mantra that Kosovo is a special case, a continuance of the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, and that it is bound to and responsible to the international community because of NATO and UN involvement, we can now establish to what extent perceptions of and interactions with Kosovo have cultivated support for its independence in the United States. The idea that Kosovo is not “special,” but is perceived as such is central to our understanding of why it

has been addressed much more favorably in United States foreign policy than its Palestinian counterpart. Alexander Wendt explains how interstate relations come to be when he says:

This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a "social act" and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings. It advances the same way. The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations nonetheless. Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes a new gesture, again signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter, and again alter responds, adding to the pool of knowledge each has about the other, and so on over time. The mechanism here is reinforcement; interaction rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discourages them from holding others.⁸⁸

This idea of an interstate repartee in which one state, through incremental interaction, identifies the intent of another, is central to the United States formation of opinion and policy regarding Kosovo and Palestine. While the rhetoric of United States policymakers is that Kosovo is a special case, and therefore, should be treated as such, one may detect in the speech of policy makers the idea that the people of Kosovo are unabashedly in favor of all things American and that these pro-American sentiments warranted, in the minds of policymakers, the United States recognition of Kosovo independence.

Upon the United States' recognition of Kosovo as independent and sovereign, then United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice averred,

President Bush has responded affirmatively to a request from Kosovo to establish diplomatic relations between our two countries. The establishment of these relations will reaffirm the special ties of friendship that have linked together the people of the United States and Kosovo...As Kosovo today begins its life as an

⁸⁸ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2. (Spring 1992), 405.

independent state, the United States pledges to continue to be its close friend and partner.⁸⁹

This statement of cooperation goes beyond the language of objective political support to the sentimental language of friends and partnership. Consequently, such statements leave one wondering what exactly the basis for this friendship is.

Kosovo defies traditional realist credentials for a likely ally, or to use the less utilitarian language of United States leadership, “friend.” Kosovo is a diminutive county with regards to geography and population; is not part of any international bloc; is too young to have much of an international political agenda beyond independence; it is not quite post-industrial with agriculture and industry each comprising 20 percent of the economy and services comprising the remaining 60 percent; and the struggling economy is evident with 45 percent unemployment, and 35 percent of the population under the poverty line.⁹⁰ These are not the makings of what a realist would typically consider a sound political, economic, or military investment, especially not at the expense of relations with other much more influential allies. So the question is why is the United States so overtly invested in the success of Kosovo as an independent nation? The first reason, quite simply, is that with its vociferous praise of the United States, Kosovo has played to America’s egoistic streak, and it is being handsomely rewarded.

The evidence that Kosovar and Albanian people hold the United States in high esteem is clear. George W. Bush replaced the celebrated Mother Theresa as the namesake

⁸⁹ Condoleezza Rice, “U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as an Independent State,” (Washington D.C.: United States Department of State, 2008). <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/100973.pdf> (Accessed November 9, 2009)

⁹⁰ “Background Note: Kosovo,” (Washington D.C.: United States Department of State, 2009). <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm> (Accessed November 9, 2009)

of a street in the capital city of Pristina, Kosovo. Former President Bill Clinton has a neighborhood named for him as well as a recently unveiled statue on Bill Clinton Boulevard in the capital.⁹¹ George W. Bush has appeared on three Albanian postage stamps and lends his name to the street that runs in front of the Albanian parliament.⁹² The Clintons and Bushes have, since the late 1990s served as the namesake for many children in Kosovo and Albania.⁹³ Many American presidents and politicians have been immensely popular in Kosovo and Albania, and the adulation of the United States and its leaders has influenced United States policy on the region, even inspiring a sense of moral obligation among United States policymakers to the newest Balkan.

A clear example of this is Congressman Eliot Engel's statement in the U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Kosovar Independence. Toeing the popular policy line on Kosovo, he asserts:

I am proud of the role the United States has played, and, of course, the people of Kosova are so pro-United States, it is one of the places in the world where chants of USA just break out all of the time. When independence was declared, I think we saw more American flags in the streets of Pristina than Albanian flags or the new Kosova flag. That is the high esteem that the people there hold for the United States, and certainly after 1999 and the ethnic cleansing of the former dictator, Milosevic, there is no way that Belgrade could have ruled Kosova ever again. So this is the logical conclusion... I am absolutely convinced that this is not only the right way to go, the

⁹¹ Reuters, "Kosovo Unveils Clinton Statue," *International Herald Tribune*. November 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/11/01/world/international-uk-kosovo-clinton-statue.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=george%20bush%20street%20kosovo&st=cse (Accessed November 2, 2009)

⁹² Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Albania Gives a Hero's Welcome to Bush," *International Herald Tribune*. June 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/world/europe/10iht-prexy.4.6079202.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=albania%20gives%20a%20hero's%20welcome&st=cse (Accessed November 2, 2009)

⁹³ Craig S. Smith, "For one visit, Bush will feel pro-U.S. glow," *New York Times*. June 9, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/world/europe/09albania.html?fta=y> (Accessed September 18, 2009)

moral way to go, but the correct way to go in terms of doing what is right and in doing what is right for stability in the region.⁹⁴

In the same hearing, many of the committee members echoed Engel's sentiments, referring to the relationship between the United States and Kosovo as one of friends and allies. Daniel Fried, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs for the United States Department of State, added in the same hearing that, "The Kosovo population is pro-American, pro-Western, rather secular in outlook, and they look to Europe as their future and to the United States as their friend."⁹⁵ This further illustrates the idea that before Kosovo formally existed as a nation that it was guaranteed to have an amicable relationship with the United States. Engel's statement is a primary example the constructivist notion that perceptions of one nation's politics and attitudes toward another can dictate the perceiving nation's policies, regardless of the greater political implications.

On the other hand, the United States has formed no such impression of Palestinian attitudes towards the U.S., but there is no such blatant pro-American sentiment among Palestinian people or their leadership. The United States has been roundly criticized by much of the Arab world for its support of Israel. That being said, one could say that the United States' support of Israel has stemmed from perceptions of pro-American attitudes among Israelis. This support of Israel continues to be one of the most prevalent grievances against the U.S. by the militant Palestinian group Hamas, which does not recognize Israel

⁹⁴ Eliot Engel, Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement," (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, March 12, 2008), 10. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf> (Accessed September 12, 2009)

⁹⁵ Daniel Fried, Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 12, 2008), 53. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf> (Accessed September 12, 2009)

and calls for its destruction in order to achieve a Palestinian state. Hamas, which split with the Palestinian Authority, presently possesses de facto control of the Gaza, while the Palestinian Authority controls the West Bank.

However, the United States' perception of Hamas as representative of the whole of politics and governing structures of Palestinians has also led to the lack of diplomatic recognition of Palestine by the United States. In other words, policymakers in the United States have consistently cited the extremist organization Hamas as the reason there has been no progress in achieving statehood for the moderate majority of Palestinians, even though Hamas is only a faction in the greater movement in favor of a Palestinian state. David Makovsky, the Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, states, "According to the Palestinian-run Jerusalem media communications center polling unit, only 35 percent of Palestinians in Gaza believe Hamas' assertion of victory"⁹⁶ after the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006. The United States' non-negotiation policy with Hamas, which is hostile toward Israel, is not representative of the majority of Palestinians and has stunted the facilitation of finding common ground among Palestinians as well as final solution processes in the broader scope.

The other reason for the disparate treatment of Kosovo that has infiltrated U.S. policymakers' speech relates to the realist concept of the balance of power, or creating alliances in order to have the most relative power in an anarchic world system. While

⁹⁶ David Makovsky, Statement from the House Foreign Relations Committee hearing "Gaza After the War: What Can Be Built on the Wreckage?" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: February 12, 2009), 18. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/47420.pdf> (Accessed September 12, 2009)

Alexander Wendt's constructivist theory is based on process, on the idea that state interests are not inherent but formed through interaction, he does concede to the Realist notion of an anarchic world system. Wendt concedes that there is no supreme and binding world government, but contradicts the realist notion that anarchy begets a self-help system, where each state seeks to maximize its relative power. However, Wendt argues that self-help as a mode of international relations has dominated because it is the system that states have created through their interaction, not because of a self-interested human nature and a natural predilection of individuals and states to seek power.⁹⁷

For the purposes of this exercise, let us accept the constructivist idea that states do, in fact, exist in an anarchical structure, that states have, if purposefully or inadvertently, created a competitive and self-help system within the anarchy and that policymakers govern states as such instead of overhauling the mode of state interaction. The relative geographical position of Kosovo and the United States' perception of its position is, therefore, a revealing piece of the puzzle that explains Kosovo's special treatment by United States foreign policy. Kosovo is located between the European Union, which the United States perceives as an ally through many EU members' participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Russia, with which the United States interacts tentatively due to a tense recent Cold War history, the vestiges of which continue almost 20 years after the disintegration of the USSR. The United States, in various political outlets has suggested its support for both Kosovo and Serbia, the latter of which has a history of close ties with Russia, in looking to the West for political cues and support.

⁹⁷ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), 394.

Statements by policymakers in the United States indicate a sort of claim being made on the Balkans by the United States on the grounds that the United States has funded, staffed, and brokered peace movements in the region. This has effectively landed Kosovo in the midst of what United States policymakers treat as an ideological tug of war with Russia. In a hearing on the future of Kosovo after the 1999 NATO campaign and before the declaration of independence, Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State explained to the House Foreign Relations Committee that,

One of the things I think we have to remember is that Russia has had a longstanding historical relationship with Serbia going back centuries. Russia and Serbia feel close to each other, but I would suggest that the United States has also had a very good relationship with Serbia. One of the points we continue to make to the Russians and others is who has done the work over the last 8 years? Whose troops have been in Kosova? Whose money has gone to support the province? Whose political efforts have been most prominent? It has been the United States and the European Union. We are the countries that no matter what the Security Council does will have to be there to help shoulder the responsibility for the aftermath. We want that aftermath to be positive and one of independence and peace rather than one of stalemate, which would be produced by a hung jury.⁹⁸

As indicated by political statements delivered by United States policymakers, old Cold War fissures linger in the formation of contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy. Burns' statement is a very clear depiction of an "us-versus-them," global power-versus-global power attitude that, in spite of the discontinuation of the cold war some 20 years ago, continues to seep into relations between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Howard Berman, Chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing after Kosovar independence, expressed his hope that Serbian voters would

⁹⁸ Nicholas Burns, Statement from U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee hearing "The Outlook for the Independence of Kosova," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: April 17, 2007), 23. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34713.pdf> (Accessed September 12, 2009)

indicate strong support for a Serbia that is firmly rooted in the Euro-Atlantic community rather than governed by radicals who seek closer ties to Russia. Although Russia has presented itself as a good friend to Serbia and has been richly rewarded for its support with a 15-percent share of Serbia's state-owned oil company, the Serb people must realize that their future lies to the West and not to the East.⁹⁹

Again, this is another illustration of Cold War attitudes continuing in the minds, mouths, and actions of foreign policy makers in the United States.

In the case of Palestine, there is no large-scale historical rivalry in the region, nor a state that the United States has perceived as a threat in the sense that it could overwhelm the United States militarily, economically, or politically. It is this lack of an influential global-scale power in the region that has created the circumstances in which the United States can defer any specific opinion or postpone any direct action on the question of the final solution of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Iran is perhaps the most prominent antagonist in the region, but the contentious nature of the relationship between Israel and Iran, as well as the United States and Iran has caused the United States to support Israel and ascribe to the realist notion of balancing, the idea that "my enemy's enemy is my friend."

These two veins of thought in United States Foreign policy toward Kosovo and Palestine belie the idea that U.S. policymakers believe that Kosovo is a unique case among self-determination movements and that this is the only reason for recognition by the United States. It is clear from the informal public speech of America's policymakers that there are at least two more reasons that Kosovo has been recognized and other movements have not,

⁹⁹ Howard L. Berman, Opening remark for U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee, "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement," Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: March 12, 2008), 2. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf> (Accessed September 12, 2009)

and that all of these reasons have been constructed through interactions with parties that are associated with the movements as well as their host nations and their geographical neighbors.

Part IV: Conclusion

The United States has, in theory, long been a proponent of self-determination, however, it has been unable to conceptualize and operationalize the idea of self-determination to generate a consistent application of policy. The United States has supported self-determination as a function of territorial integrity and political sovereignty for existing states, and with the recognition of Kosovo, has supported self-determination as a breach of territorial sovereignty for an existing state in order to enfranchise a stateless people. This double standard has confused United States policymakers as well as leadership worldwide, especially with regard to stateless peoples who have long been denied the same support that Kosovo has received from the America.

In statements made for public consumption, U.S. policymakers have offered a unified message to the international community that Kosovo is recognized as independent and sovereign because it is a “special case.” However, in exploring the elements of the self-determination in Kosovo, juxtaposed with Palestine, this paper has argued that the two movements are not so unlike such as to warrant such drastically dissimilar treatment. Both have the elements of territorial, ethnic, and religious struggle, both have existed within states in which they have a degree of political autonomy; and both have taken the step of declaring independence.

The United States maintains that Kosovo is made more unique by its population's subjection to ethnic cleansing campaigns and an unusual degree of involvement by international organizations. This paper has also explained that the population of Palestine has also sustained considerable suffering through ethnic cleansing by Israelis (although most policymakers, media, and scholars balk at the use of the term "ethnic cleansing" in this particular case) and that the United Nations has been involved, on varying levels, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for over 50 years, more or less since the creation of the Israeli state.

While U.S. rhetoric exalts Kosovo as a special case, informal public speech by policymakers conveys two other reasons that America has fervently supported Kosovar independence, yet approached the Palestine's bid for independence seldom with enthusiasm and often with apprehension. The United States, in the vein of Wendt's social constructivist theory, has responded exceedingly well to the outpouring of pro-Americanism in Kosovo. Conversely, American support of Israel has inspired suspicion and frustration among Palestinians, which in some cases comes across as Anti-Americanism, and in other cases is merely interpreted as such. Either way, the United States has withheld overt support from a self-determination movement which sits atop the proverbial fence with regard to its attitude towards the U.S.

Secondly, U.S. policymakers have made it evident in informal addresses that Russia has played a critical role in the American support of Kosovo as an independent state. Because there is no sweeping ideological framework to replace ideas, beliefs, and politics ingrained during the Cold War, these attitudes and divisions linger into a political

environment in which they are no longer relevant.¹⁰⁰ An increasingly opaque Russian political culture coupled with expanding wealth from the natural gas industry has presented a new challenge to United States policymakers, in which Russia has been interpreted as a foil to American ideals, economics, and global influence. Wendt argues that anarchy is the present nature of the international system and from that anarchy, states have, through their interaction, formed realist-style self-help political environment. Thus, the United States has sought to expand its sphere of influence by encouraging the cycle of support between America and Kosovo in order to minimize Russia's influence in the Balkans.

It is evident that the manner in which foreign policy decisions are rationalized by policymakers in the United States is often superficial and rhetorical, but that these policies are developed through interactions with and perceptions of political circumstances and when practiced, give way to deeper motivations for policy implementation. This inconsistent treatment of like self-determination movements by United States foreign policy detracts from the international credibility of the United States, as well as agitates the less-favored groups and causes decreased stability in the regions in which these movements occur.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Entman, *Projections of Power*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).

Works Cited

- Ash, Timothy Garton. "The Kosovo precedent." *Los Angeles Times*, (February 21, 2008). <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ash21feb21,0,6880108.story>. (Accessed April 7, 2008)
- Ahtisaari, Martti. "Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status." United Nations Security Council (March 26, 2007) <http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf>. (Accessed December 4, 2009)
- "Background Note: Kosovo," (Washington D.C.: United States Department of State, 2009). <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.html> (Accessed November 9, 2009)
- Bakke, Kristen M., and Erik Wibbels. "Diversity, Disparity, and Civil Conflict in Federal States." *World Politics* 59, no. 1 (October 2006): 13-14.
- Balfour, Arthur James. *The Balfour Declaration* (November 2, 1917), <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/balfour.html> (Accessed November 30, 2009).
- Berman, Howard. Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement." U.S. Government Printing Office, (March 12, 2008) <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf> (Accessed May 31, 2009).
- Bideleux, Robert and Ian Jeffries. *The Balkans: A Post Communist History*. London: Routledge, 2007.
- Burns, R. Nicholas. Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Outlook for the Independence of Kosova." U.S. Government Printing Office. (April 17, 2007), <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34713.pdf> (Accessed May 31 2009).
- Carley, Patricia. "Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession." *Peaceworks* No.7 (April 1996): v.

Chomsky, Noam. *The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo*. Monroe: Common Courage, 1999.

Corntassel, Jeff J. and Thomas Hopkins Primeau. "Indigenous 'Sovereignty' and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing 'Self-Determination.'" *Human Rights Quarterly* 17, No. 2 (May 1995): 353.

Emerson, Rupert. "The Principle of Self Determination." In *From Empire to Nation*. Cambridge: Harvard, 1974.

Engel, Eliot. Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. (March 12, 2008).
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf>.

Entman, Robert. *Projections of Power*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Etzioni, Amitai. "The Evils of Self-Determination." *Foreign Policy* 89 (Winter 1992-93): 27.

Falk, Richard. "Self Determination Under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience." In *The Self Determination of Peoples*, ed. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2002.

Farsoun, Samih K. and Naseer H. Aruri. *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 2nd edition Boulder: Westview, 2006.

Fried, Daniel. Statement from House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve of NATO Enlargement Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (March 12, 2008)
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41230.pdf>.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell, 1983.

Harms, Gregory with Todd M. Ferry. *The Palestine Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*. 2nd edition. London: Pluto, 2008.

Herzl, Theodore. "The Jewish State." 1896,
<http://www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pdf> (Accessed November 30 , 2009)

Hirsh, Michael. *At War With Ourselves*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Hunter, Robert E. "A Conversation with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer." Council on Foreign Relations. (November, 2004)
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7534/conversation_with_jaap_de_hoop_scheffer.html (Accessed October 18, 2007)

Ignatieff, Michael. *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

"Israel and Palestine: A Brief History." (June 10, 2009)
<http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm#The British Mandate> (Accessed November 30, 2009).

Judah, Tim. *Kosovo: What Everyone Needs To Know*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

League of Nations. "The Palestine Mandate." <http://www.mideastweb.org/mandate.htm> (accessed November 30, 2009).

Levy, Jacob T. "Self-Determination, Non-Domination, and Federalism." *Hypatia* 23, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 60.

Makovsky, David. Statement from the House Foreign Relations Committee Hearing: "Gaza After the War: What Can Be Built on the Wreckage?" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office: February 12, 2009),
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/47420.pdf>.

Moris, Halim. "Self Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?" *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law* 4, no. 1, (Fall 1997):

Morris, Benny. *One State, Two States*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

NATO. "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,"
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21017.htm?selectedLocale=en
(Accessed September 23, 2009).

NATO. "NATO's Role in Kosovo,"
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (Accessed December 4, 2009).

Ottermann, Sharon. "Middle East: The Road Map to Peace." CouncilonForeignRelations.Org,
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/7738/> (Accessed December 1, 2009).

Palestine Facts. "What happened at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982?"
PalestineFacts.Org,
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_sabra_shatila.php (Accessed
December 1, 2009).

Palestine Facts. "What happened during the Al-Aqsa Intifada?" PalestinianFacts.Org,
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_alaqsa_course.php (Accessed
December 1, 2009).

Palestine Facts. "Why did Israel invade Lebanon in 1982?" PalestineFacts.Org,
http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_lebanon_198x_backgd.php
(Accessed December 1, 2009).

Palestinian National Authority. "International Recognition of the State of Palestine."
http://web.archive.org/web/20060404211437/http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine.asp (accessed February 19, 2009).

Pappe, Ilan. *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.

PBS Newshour. "Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina."
PBS.org, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/dayton_peace.html (Accessed
December 1, 2009).

Pierce, Anne R. *Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman: Mission and Power in American
Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger, 2003.

Reuters. "Kosovo Unveils Clinton Statue." *International Herald Tribune*.
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/11/01/world/international-uk-kosovo-clinton-statue.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=george%20bush%20street%20kosovo&st=cse
(Accessed November 2, 2009).

Raic, David. *Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination*. New York: Springer, 2002.

Rice, Condoleezza. "U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as an Independent State."
(Washington D.C.: United States Department of State, 2008),
<http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/EUR/State/100973.pdf>.

Roskin, Michael G. *The Rebirth of Eastern Europe*, 4th edition. Upper Saddle River: Prentice
Hall, 2002.

Smith, Craig S. "For one visit, Bush will feel pro-U.S. glow." *New York Times*.
June 9, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/world/europe/09albania.html?fta=y>
(accessed September 18, 2009).

Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. "Albania Gives a Hero's Welcome to Bush." *International Herald
Tribune*. June 10, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/world/europe/10iht-prexy.4.6079202.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=albania%20gives%20a%20hero's%20welcome&st=cse (Accessed November 2, 2009).

Talbott, Strobe. "Self-Determination in an Interdependent World." *Foreign Policy*.
No. 118. (2000): 152.

The Six Day War. "Causes and Consequences. Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, <http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/introduction.asp> (Accessed November 30, 2009).

United Nations. "Question of Palestine: History."
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html> (accessed: November 30, 2009).

United Nations. "The Question of Palestine and the United Nations."
<http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/DPI2499.pdf> (Accessed October 15, 2009).

United Nations. UN Charter. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.shtml> (Accessed July 17, 2009).

United Nations. *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.
<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (Accessed July 17, 2009).

United Nations. *UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*.
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (Accessed July 17, 2009).

United Nations. *UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights*.
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ceschr.htm (Accessed July 17, 2009).

Walt, Stephen. *Taming American Power*. New York: Norton, 2005.

Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power."
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992): 394.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York: Norton, 1972.

Wilson, Woodrow. *Fourteen Points*. January 8, 1918. Avalon Project: Yale.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (Accessed: April 1, 2009).

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lauren Briana Miller was born in Hickory, North Carolina on August 23, 1983. She attended grade school in that city and graduated from Hickory High School in June 2001. The following term, she entered Appalachian State University as a student of Political Science and German Studies, earning a Bachelor of Science and Bachelor of Arts degree in these areas, respectively. In the Fall of 2007 she accepted an assistantship in Political Science and began study toward a Master of Arts degree. The degree was awarded in May 2010.

Ms. Miller is the daughter of Donald Alan and Karen Ketcham Miller of Hickory, North Carolina.